The instinct to compare Ukraine and Taiwan is understandable, and there are critical lessons to be drawn from the war in Ukraine, but the parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan should not be overdrawn.
The strategy of archipelagic defense puts a premium on fortifying relevant islands in the Indo-Pacific region with anti-ship missiles, and air and missile defense systems. But political, economic, environmental, and military reasons make it a bad idea for the U.S. military.
Leaders in Washington and allied capitals must not allow their military and diplomatic plans for the Indo-Pacific region to be colored by misinformation about China’s goals. There are a bevy of factors that could lead China to make a move against Taiwan at any time. Assuming that PLA capabilities are the sole variable in Beijing’s calculus would be a costly and dangerous mistake.
The Biden administration recently announced that no official U.S. delegation will attend the Olympic games in Beijing this winter. But a boycott of any form from the United States and partners will have little to no impact on shaping China’s behavior and may in fact distract from real levers capable of curbing how the games serve Chinese leadership.
The release of the next National Defense Strategy, expected in early 2022, will address the continued importance of China as a “pacing threat” even as it recognizes the “increasingly complicated and complex security landscape.” As the renewed potential for great power conflict drives strategy and plans, some have dubbed this a “new Cold War.” Letting this planning construct drive DoD’s investment program without paying attention to other kinds of potential contingencies is a bad idea.
As the Biden administration implements “integrated deterrence,” Thomas Spoehr warns the application of non-military tools, such as economic sanctions and diplomatic condemnation, should not replace or diminish the need to build sufficient military power.
ISP senior fellow John Schaus answers the pressing questions regarding the AUKUS announcement.
Russia has been dismissed as a declining by some policymakers and analysts who prefer to focus on competition with China. Yet Russia remains one of the most assertive and powerful states in the international system and ignoring the threat it poses is a strategic error.
While the U.S. is prioritizing relationships with nations that have highly-developed space programs, China is building out partnerships with nations that have underdeveloped programs. If the U.S. does not reorient its focus, it risks ceding leadership in this critical domain to China.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy called out the “reemergence of long-term, strategic competition.” While this was a smart shift in focus, the widely used “great power competition” is the wrong term to describe this new priority.