CSIS International Security Program experts Kathleen Hicks, Seth Jones, Todd Harrison, Andrew Hunter, Mark Cancian, and Rebecca Hersman discuss the NDS and the resource challenges that may impact its implementation.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 was intended to promote compromise, yet that has not been the case in practice. Gregory Sanders explains why treating the budget caps as a one-off mistake, rather than a reflection of diminished political capacity, is a bad idea.
It is a bad idea for Congress to pursue a new AUMF without a constructive debate. In this piece, Tommy Ross outlines the importance of addressing critical questions and formulating a debate for any new AUMF legislation.
Although SOF provides a valued role in performing TAA and security cooperation missions; it is misguided for the defense department to solely rely on SOF. This piece examines the trade-offs of limiting security cooperation missions to SOF.
Intentions are well, but the formation of national unity governments in conflict-ridden states is a cookie cutter idea the U.S. should reconsider using.
The strategy of ‘deal-making’ is a hallmark of the political approach employed by the Trump administration and some in Congress. But a deal-making approach is a simple-minded strategy for public policy that disregards crucial implications and complexities that are inherent in politics, that can have negative implications for national security interests.
There is no doubt that a war with North Korea is a bad idea. In this piece, John Schaus highlights the cost attributed to starting a pre-emptive strike against North Korea and emphasizes the importance of persistent and patient diplomatic efforts.
While the use of drones in West Africa is an operational tool, Alice Hunt Friend contends that they will make the U.S. counterterrorism efforts harder to acquire.
The United States has upheld a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992, but numerous voices have emerged in recent years to urge a resumption of nuclear tests. William Caplan argues the U.S. should not forfeit its nonproliferation credibility and risk starting a string of nuclear tests that threatens the nuclear order.
Perpetuating the debate over capabilities-based planning versus threat-based planning can only inhibit informed discussion of force planning and needs analysis, writes Kathleen Hicks.