Read the most recent CSIS research on U.S. military force structure.
Amid a surge in military aviation accidents over the past five fiscal years and four surface fleet incidents between FY 2017 and FY 2018 that killed 17 sailors—calls for a solution to the military’s “readiness crisis” continue to be heard despite recent budget increases. But what is readiness and how does it relate to the recent spell of deadly incidents?
As the Trump administration has moved into its second year in office, it has laid out its vision for national security. This volume presents CSIS experts’ assessment of the Trump administration’s strategy documents and FY 2019 budgets for defense.
Later this spring, the Trump administration will release its 2018 Missile Defense Review (MDR), which is expected to better align U.S. missile defense policy with the present security environment. President Barack Obama’s 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) reflected the security environment of the time and the aspirations of the Obama administration. In particular, technological advances by U.S. adversaries and a renewed focus on long-term competition with Russia and China drive the need for a new review.
The budget deal’s large defense increase in FY 2019 allows the Department of Defense (DOD) to do a lot more than it was doing before, but not everything. A major trade-off is with force structure. The forces proposed are more than what Secretary of Defense James Mattis had originally signaled but less than what President Donald Trump’s rhetoric had implied.
Last week, the Trump administration formally released its review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Judging by reactions over what amounts to the longest rollout in Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) history, there is something in it for everyone. That means almost no one is happy.
CSIS International Security Program experts Kathleen Hicks, Seth Jones, Todd Harrison, Andrew Hunter, Mark Cancian, and Rebecca Hersman discuss the NDS and the resource challenges that may impact its implementation.
The idea of space-based missile interceptors is not new nor prohibited, but it is a bad idea. This piece looks beyond the policy arguments and explores the inefficiencies and vulnerabilities of space-based missiles.
Although SOF provides a valued role in performing TAA and security cooperation missions; it is misguided for the defense department to solely rely on SOF. This piece examines the trade-offs of limiting security cooperation missions to SOF.
While de-alerting the U.S. ICBMs is an option for minimizing nuclear risks it does not solve the problems associated with the threat. The authors of this piece outline why it is ill-advised to pursue this option as a solution.
Emphasis on accountability, although valuable and necessary, can impede the defense acquisition process rather than alleviate problems. Acquisition reform must look beyond placing blame and create an environment that values collaboration and risk-taking as it seeks to improve the challenges in the acquisition process.