D360’s Bad Ideas in National Security series features short articles from CSIS and outside scholars on recently considered and not too obvious bad ideas in the defense and foreign policy space.
The officer-enlisted divide stymies the effectiveness of today’s armed forces, writes Nicholas Wood. Merging officers and enlisted into one hierarchical pyramid will unleash untapped leadership potential, remove redundancies, and put people in the positions for which they are best suited.
Navy and shipbuilding advocates tell us that global patrols of U.S. warships constantly protect sea-borne commerce. But this myth places demands for presence on the Navy that degrades its readiness.
The strategy of archipelagic defense puts a premium on fortifying relevant islands in the Indo-Pacific region with anti-ship missiles, and air and missile defense systems. But political, economic, environmental, and military reasons make it a bad idea for the U.S. military.
Leaders in Washington and allied capitals must not allow their military and diplomatic plans for the Indo-Pacific region to be colored by misinformation about China’s goals. There are a bevy of factors that could lead China to make a move against Taiwan at any time. Assuming that PLA capabilities are the sole variable in Beijing’s calculus would be a costly and dangerous mistake.
If strategic competition is much about analyzing information for decisions faster than an adversary, software will be at the heart of that competition. The national security enterprise should engage the flywheel of innovation and free-market competition in the commercial software sector for national defense.
The Biden administration recently announced that no official U.S. delegation will attend the Olympic games in Beijing this winter. But a boycott of any form from the United States and partners will have little to no impact on shaping China’s behavior and may in fact distract from real levers capable of curbing how the games serve Chinese leadership.
Every few years, an event will happen that various pundits and commentators declare to be a “Sputnik Moment.” But calling something a “Sputnik Moment” without understanding what really happened during the original Sputnik crisis is a bad idea.
The Department of Defense, alongside the U.S. Coast Guard, seizes enormous quantities of cocaine in transit to the United States each year. But DoD needs better metrics to capture exactly how much over-market value it “pays” for the cocaine it seizes.
The next U.S. National Defense Strategy will be about winning the strategic competition with China (and to a lesser extent, Russia). Much of this will play out short of armed conflict, in the ”gray zone” between peace and war. But trying to “win” gray zone competition is a bad idea.
The release of the next National Defense Strategy, expected in early 2022, will address the continued importance of China as a “pacing threat” even as it recognizes the “increasingly complicated and complex security landscape.” As the renewed potential for great power conflict drives strategy and plans, some have dubbed this a “new Cold War.” Letting this planning construct drive DoD’s investment program without paying attention to other kinds of potential contingencies is a bad idea.