Read featured commentary from CSIS experts on the latest developments in defense and national security.
If strategic competition is much about analyzing information for decisions faster than an adversary, software will be at the heart of that competition. The national security enterprise should engage the flywheel of innovation and free-market competition in the commercial software sector for national defense.
The Biden administration recently announced that no official U.S. delegation will attend the Olympic games in Beijing this winter. But a boycott of any form from the United States and partners will have little to no impact on shaping China’s behavior and may in fact distract from real levers capable of curbing how the games serve Chinese leadership.
Every few years, an event will happen that various pundits and commentators declare to be a “Sputnik Moment.” But calling something a “Sputnik Moment” without understanding what really happened during the original Sputnik crisis is a bad idea.
The Department of Defense, alongside the U.S. Coast Guard, seizes enormous quantities of cocaine in transit to the United States each year. But DoD needs better metrics to capture exactly how much over-market value it “pays” for the cocaine it seizes.
The next U.S. National Defense Strategy will be about winning the strategic competition with China (and to a lesser extent, Russia). Much of this will play out short of armed conflict, in the ”gray zone” between peace and war. But trying to “win” gray zone competition is a bad idea.
The release of the next National Defense Strategy, expected in early 2022, will address the continued importance of China as a “pacing threat” even as it recognizes the “increasingly complicated and complex security landscape.” As the renewed potential for great power conflict drives strategy and plans, some have dubbed this a “new Cold War.” Letting this planning construct drive DoD’s investment program without paying attention to other kinds of potential contingencies is a bad idea.
Today, seven geographic COCOMs are responsible for integrating forces across all domains for military operations within their respective Areas of Responsibility. But in today’s increasingly complex, connected, and multipolar strategic environment, the geographic COCOM structure is an outdated and counterproductive bad idea.
In June 2018, Space Policy Directive (SPD)-3 named the Department of Commerce as the civil agency successor to the Defense Department catalog for SSA. Over three years later, the Open Architecture Data Repository (OADR)—the public civilian catalog designated to replace the military catalog—is still not developed and the Office of Space Commerce (OSC) continues to operate with a limited staff led by an acting administrator. This sends a message that SSA is not a priority for the United States, delays national security priorities for DoD, and threatens the safety of space assets.
As DoD pushes to divest legacy platforms, it must consider whether existing forces are capable of meeting operational demands without straining personnel and platforms. If not, the mission set may need to change.
Instead of following operational processes that are centered on ever-changing programmatic objectives, DoD ought to focus its efforts at the portfolio level and drive mission impact.