Read featured commentary from CSIS experts on the latest developments in defense and national security.
Today, seven geographic COCOMs are responsible for integrating forces across all domains for military operations within their respective Areas of Responsibility. But in today’s increasingly complex, connected, and multipolar strategic environment, the geographic COCOM structure is an outdated and counterproductive bad idea.
In June 2018, Space Policy Directive (SPD)-3 named the Department of Commerce as the civil agency successor to the Defense Department catalog for SSA. Over three years later, the Open Architecture Data Repository (OADR)—the public civilian catalog designated to replace the military catalog—is still not developed and the Office of Space Commerce (OSC) continues to operate with a limited staff led by an acting administrator. This sends a message that SSA is not a priority for the United States, delays national security priorities for DoD, and threatens the safety of space assets.
As DoD pushes to divest legacy platforms, it must consider whether existing forces are capable of meeting operational demands without straining personnel and platforms. If not, the mission set may need to change.
Instead of following operational processes that are centered on ever-changing programmatic objectives, DoD ought to focus its efforts at the portfolio level and drive mission impact.
There is a national security imperative in not only making sure social media platforms are regulated, but that they are done so properly in a way that enhances, rather than thwarts, the free and open discourse that our democracy relies on.
Existing efforts to develop a Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) are critical to U.S. success, but these efforts rely too heavily on a siloed process from the military services.
Policymakers are seeking new concepts of deterrence to confront gray zone tactics. Deterrence by detection, however, has two critical flaws, writes Emily Harding: a lack of technical capability and lack of credible will to respond.
The forthcoming National Defense Strategy will likely call for reductions in day-to-day deployments to focus on China. But if the administration cannot specify the necessary tradeoffs, it must build the force necessary for continued global engagement.
As the Biden administration implements “integrated deterrence,” Thomas Spoehr warns the application of non-military tools, such as economic sanctions and diplomatic condemnation, should not replace or diminish the need to build sufficient military power.
Continuing to start the fiscal year on October 1 will only perpetuate the current pattern of delayed appropriations and DoD programs, writes Robert Hale.